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Offi c ia l  defi n i t ions of race and ethn i c ity i n  Amer ican 
law reveal a great dea l about pub l i c  po l i cy in an  envi­
ronment of ethn i c  p l u ra l i sm .  Desp i te some ambigu i ty 
over who i s  b l ack or H i span ic  or an  Aleut, re lative ly 
few peop le  fa l l  between the wide cracks in the 
American patchwork of i dent ity c l ass i fi cat ions .  Those 
cracks, however, te l l  us a great deal about the ambiva­
lence of the American pol i ty toward ethn ic i ty. 1 
Laws, regu lat ion,  gu ide l i nes, and j ud i c i a l  op i n ions a re 
soc ia l  art ifacts that prov ide ev idence about how a soc iety dea l s  
with certa i n  perce ived prob lems .  Laws are des igned to serve 
soc ia l  pu rposes and change as the pu rposes change; the spec if ic 
form they may take reflects a need for congruence between l aws 
as i nstruments of po l i cy and the pu rposes of po l i cy. A su rvey of 
l aws on race and ethn i c ity suggests th ree d i fferent po l i cy a ims :  
(1) l aws mandati ng separation and d i sparate treatment, (2) l aws 
proh ib it i ng d isparate treatment, and (3 )  l aws encou ragi ng aggre­
gate changes i n  eth n i c  representation .  Each pu rpose has had a 
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correspond i ng form of defi n it ion . If the pu rpose of a l aw i s  to 
mandate d iverse treatment of i nd iv idua l s  based on race or eth­
n ic i ty, the l aw m ust be qu i te prec ise about who fa l l s  i nto wh ich 
category, because an adm i n istrator i s  expected to make c lear  d i s­
ti nct ions i n  i nd iv idua l  cases . Hence, it is not surpri s i ng that l aws 
on race became more prec ise fo l lowi ng the abol i t ion of s l avery, 
espec ia l ly  as segregation hardened i n  the post-Reconstruction 
South ,  and that segregation laws conta i ned qu i te prec ise defi n i ­
ti ons .  On the other hand i f  a law i s  i ntended to prevent d i ffer­
ent i a l  treatment, there is m uch less need for spec ify ing who i s  
what; i n  fact, l eg is l ators are l i ke ly  to be  very uncomfortab le  
about  defi n i t ions .  Fi na l ly, when l aws are i ntended to mandate 
aggregate changes i n  ethn i c  composit ion i n  soc ia l  i nstitutions 
-em p loyment, education, or po l i t ica l  parti c i pation, for example­
there i s  a need for workable genera l izations upon wh ich aggre­
gate data can be co l lected, but not a need for accu rate determ i ­
nation  i n  each i nd iv idua l  case . Hence, loose defi n i t ions that 
work more or l ess wel l  (H i span ic  su rnames, for examp le) may be 
a l l  that is considered necessary to achieve the overa l l  goa l ,  i n  
sp i te of thei r u nder- and over- i nc l us iveness i n  i nd iv idua l  cases . 
These th ree model s  refl ect, rough ly, the h i stor ica l  deve lop­
ment of American l aws on race and ethn ic i ty, but the correspon­
dence i s  punctuated with trans it ions and i ncons istenc ies .  Ou r  
i nterest i s  i n  the po l i cy imp l ications of each mode l ,  rather than 
i n  try i ng to impose or i nfer a stri ct sequentia l  order. But  pub l i c  
pol i cy i s  not a "seam less web" or a rat iona l  orderi ng of  ru l es .  
J u st as the  American pol i ty and dec i s ion-maki ng process i s  frag­
mented, d i sorder ly pol icy resu lts reflect the i ncons istent a ims  of 
competing comm u n it ies. The cu rrent pecu l i ar  m ixtu re of e l abo­
rate gu i del ines and awkward defi n i t ions reflects the soc iety's 
amb iva lence between non-d iscr i m i nat ion (co lor-b l i nd) and affi r­
mat ive action (co lor-conscious) pol icy goa l s .  Indeed, i t  is the 
s i m u l taneous ex istence of the second and th i rd model s  wh ich 
makes the contemporary American approach to race and ethn i c­
i ty so comp lex. 
Fu rthermore, a c lose look at eth n i c  po l i cy revea l s  the impor­
tance of "who i s  what,"but a l so of "wh ich groups cou nts ." Why 
do Afr ican Americans and H i span ics cou nt as m inorit ies for pu r­
poses of the 1 965 Vot ing Rights Law but not Has id ic  Jews? Why 
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are there affi rmative action programs for As i ans and H ispan ics 
but not for Arabs and I r i sh ?  Obvious ly i t  i s  a matter of perceived 
needs and pr ior i t ies .  There is abso l ute ly  no log ic  i n  d iv id i ng 
America's popu l at ion i nto Wh i te, B l ack, H i span ic, Native 
American, and As ian ,  as though the terms were exc l us ive and 
comprehens ive; the d i sti nct ion i s  pu re ly  a matter of conven­
ience. For some pu rposes, a s imp le  separat ion may be al l  that is 
necessary -"whi te" and "nonwh ite ." For other pu rposes we sep­
arate out the so-ca l led "wh ite-ethn i cs" and cou nt Southern and 
Eastern Eu ropeans as m i nor it ies .  At some t imes As ians are c las­
s i fied together; i n  Wor ld War I I , i t  became cruc ia l  to d i sti ngu ish 
Japanese from a l l  other As ians .  I n  some parts of  the country 
"H i span i c" means Mex ican-Ameri can, i n  other parts Cuban or 
Puerto R ican,  and in other parts there are too few to make a d i f­
ference. I n  most of the U n i ted States, "b lack" wi l l  do to del i n­
eate Afr ican Ameri cans from Whites; i n  parts of the East coast, i t  
can be usefu l to d i st i ngu i sh  "native" B l acks from West I nd ian 
B l acks .  I n  most of  the  states, A laskan natives are j ust that; i n  
Alaska pub l i c  po l i cy pu rposes can  req u i re more prec ise cate­
gories. A s i m i l a r  paradigm can be pos i ted for Hawa i i  between 
Hawai ians  and Native Hawa i i ans .  I n  short for pub l i c  pol icy pur­
poses eth n ic i ty i s  po l i t ica l ly defi ned, and ethno log ica l  prec is ion 
s imply does not matter. Words, l i ke too ls, reflect the needs of the 
peop le who use them; where a l l  we need i s  a meat axe, we are 
not l i ke ly  to fi nd su rg ica l  sca l pe l s .  
II 
By far the most extens ive use of race and ethn i c ity i n  American 
l aw has been to enforce rac ia l  separat ion and to perpetuate a 
comp lex soc ia l  h ierarchy. Such l aws seem to serve two closely 
re l ated pu rposes. Some are i ntended to ensu re separat ion-anti ­
m iscegenat ion l aws are the most obvious; i n  add it ion,  l aws 
requ i ri ng rac ia l  segregation i n  school s, fac i l i t ies of transportat ion 
and accommodation are of th i s  type. Second, l aws may be 
a imed at preserv ing the i nfer ior status of m i nor it ies by mandat­
i ng, i nfer ior treatment -for examp le, l aws req u i r i ng certa i n  acts 
of soc ia l  deference by B l acks towards Whi tes, l aws preventi ng 
B l acks from attend ing  certa i n  school s  and u n ivers it ies, voting, 
serv i ng on j u ries or enteri ng certa i n  profess ions, or l aws 
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proh ib it i ng  As ians  from own i ng land served th i s  pu rpose. G iven 
the pre-em i nence of race i n  the American exper ience, the great 
bu l k  of both ki nds of law dea l with the re l ationsh ip  between 
wh i tes and nonwh ites . 
Laws sti pu l at ing the proper re l ationsh ip  between the races 
were adopted very ear ly i n  the co lon ia l  period . These formative 
po l i c ies reflect a qu i te unse l f-consc ious bel ief i n  white super ior­
i ty and  an acceptance of h ierarchy as part of the natu re of th i ngs. 
The ear ly status of Afr icans was ambiguous; most arr ived as 
s l aves, but Afr ican s l avery was not recogn ized as a l ega l i nst i tu­
t ion u nti l arou nd 1 640. The fi rst such laws, therefore, were con­
cerned with regu lati ng the soc ia l  status of b l acks and creat ing the 
i nst i tut ions of s l avery. By the fi rst years of the eighteenth centu­
ry, extens ive codes regu l ated occupation,  res idence, and mar­
r i age . The Revo l ut ion d id  not create any dramati c change i n  th i s  
k i nd  of  l aw, except that they became more e l aborate as the prac­
tice of s l avery became i nstitutiona l ized in Southern and border 
states . As s l avery was abo l i shed in the North i t  was rep laced by 
segregation l aws . Reconstruction changes were extremely short­
l ived . The most extens ive use of rac ia l  defi n i t ions i n  American 
l aw i s  a post-Reconstruction phenomenon, begi n n i ng with the 
B l ack Codes and e l aborated more extens ive ly in a ha l f  centu ry of 
J i m  Crow laws, which pers i sted wel l  past the m idpoi nt of the 
2 0th centu ry. 
Seem i ng ly ignorant of the expand i ng process of mestizaje 
much  less of the m ix i ng of Afr icans and Eu ropeans a l ready root­
ed i n  Span ish America, at the begi n n i ng of thei r sett lements i n  
America the Engl i sh  d i d  not foresee any need to defi ne race; i t  
seemed too obvious to need defi n it ion . Afr icans begot Afr icans 
in the New Wor ld as in the o ld in the same way that Eng l i sh  
begot Engl i sh  i n  both worlds, and rac ia l  d i sti nct ions were seen as  
an unambiguous part of  the order of  nature, but the occurrence 
of u n ions between B l acks and Whites i n  B r i t ish Ameri ca created 
a need for rac ia l  defi n i t ions .  The fi rst response was the adoption 
of anti -m i scegenat ion l aws; they were a l ready on the books i n  
Mary land a n d  Vi rg i n i a  by the 1 660s. The major i ty of the co lon ies 
enacted statutes des igned to out law not on ly  marri age, but a l so 
any sexua l  re l at ions between Wh ites and others .  A l lowi ng for 
var iat ion from colony to colony, such statutes a l so provided for 
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pun i sh i ng m i n i sters who conducted i nterraci a l  marr i age cere­
mon ies, ens lavement or ban i shment of wh ite women who 
entered proscri bed marr iages, payment of doub le  fi nes by those 
who engaged i n  i nterrac i a l  forn ication, and p l acement of the off­
spri ng of i nterrac ia l  sex i nto the s l ave status of the mother i f  the 
mother was b l ack and i nto ens l avement if  the mother was wh ite .  
I n  genera l  the pena l ty was far more severe on the b l ack partner 
than on the wh ite one, and, need less to say, extra- lega l enforce­
ment was far more Dracon ian  than anyth i ng found  i n  the code­
books.2 
Laws were power less i n  the face of h u man  natu re . 
I nterrac ia l  u n ions conti nued to occur  and thus  forced Euro­
Americans to recons ider the i r  u nderstand i ng of race. Accord i ng 
to a chron ic ler of the co lon i a l  period, Vi rgi n i a  was "swarm i ng 
with m u lattoes ." What had seemed s imp le  and u nambiguous 
became c louded by gradat ions and complexit ies .  The response 
to th i s  comp lex i ty d i sp layed two contrad ictory impu l ses, a s imu l ­
taneous des i re both to recogn i ze and to deny these ambigu it ies. 
On the one hand a lmost every state wrote i nto i ts l aws some offi ­
c ia l  defi n it ion of the gradat ions of race; on the other hand the 
same l aws ob l i terated any s ign i ficance of those gradations by 
col l aps i ng the categor ies back to "wh ite" and "nonwh ite." The 
gradations ranged from the use of the term m u latto to defi ne per­
sons of b lack and wh ite parentage to the more e laborate 
Lou is iana code that del i neated degrees of wh iteness through 
seven prev ious generations) 
F luctuat ions i n  the U .S .  Census rac ia l  c lass i fi cat ions are 
espec ia l l y  i nstructive. They rem i nd us  that the defi n i tion of who 
was b lack has been determ i ned from the begi n n i ng by Whites . 
Even though the co lon ies had l eg i s l ated degrees of b lackness 
and Whi tes and B l acks had been ident ified i n  every census, 
begi n n i ng with the fi rst one i n  1 790, it was on ly  i n  1 850  with the 
Seventh Census, that the B u reau of the Census made a d i sti nc­
t ion between m u lattoes and B l acks. The 1 850  Census c l ass if ied 
the popu l at ion as wh ite, b l ack, or m u latto, a l though there were 
no i nstructions for defi n i ng "mu l atto ." In contrast to the mod­
ern census a person did not ident ify h i s  or her category; rather it 
was left to the enumerator to determ i ne.  I n  the 1 870 and 1 880 
censuses m u l attoes were offi c i a l l y  defi ned to i nc l ude 
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"quadroons, octoroons, and persons hav ing any percepti b le  
trace of  Afr ican b lood." The i nterest i n  spec ific i ty reached i ts 
he ight i n  the 1 890 Census .  The enumerators were i nstructed:  
Be parti cu l a r ly carefu l to d i sti ngu ish between b lacks, 
m u lattoes, quadroons, and octoroons .  The word 
'b lack' shou l d  be used to descri be those persons who 
have th ree-fourths or more b lack b lood; 'mu l atto,' 
those persons who have th ree-e ighths to five-e ighths 
b l ack b lood; 'quadroon,' those persons who have one­
fou rth b lack b lood; 'octoroons,' those persons have 
one-e ighth or any trace of b lack b lood .4 
I t  i s  not at a l l  c lear how enumerators were expected to gath­
er th i s  i nformation, and i ts useless complexity was abandoned 
after 1 900 i n  favor of the s imp l if ied c lass ifi cations, "b l ack" and 
" m u latto ." The m u latto category was dropped i n  1 920, and from 
that year forward anyone with any percepti b le  B l ack Afr ican 
ancestry was s imp ly  defi ned as Negro. These determ i nat ions 
were made by census enumerators u nti l the 1 960 census, wh ich 
then rested the determ inat ion with the head of househo ld 
respons ib le  for fi l l i ng out the census form .5 
These examples demonstrate an i ncons istency of rac ia l  po l ­
i cy with i n  the fi rst mode l .  States were making qu ite exp l ic i t  a nd  
e laborate rac ia l  d i st i nctions and  then negati ng them by treat ing 
persons of  a l l  gradations as b l ack. North Caro l i na, for examp le, 
carefu l ly defi ned m u lattoes as persons with one-s ixteenth Negro 
ancestry and then proceeded to c l ass ify m u lattoes as Negroes for 
the pu rposes of i ts l aw.6 Lou is iana i s  qu i te i n structive. Reca l l the 
deta i led provis ions in the state's l aw. Also reca l l that Plessy v. 
Ferguson, the case i n  which the Supreme Cou rt gave constitu­
t iona l i ty to the doctr i ne of separate but equa l ,  i nvo lved a 
Lou i s iana  l aw wh ich req u i red rac ia l ly  separate ra i l road accom­
modat ions, and that Homer P lessy's cha l l enge was based i n  part 
on h is objection to Lou is iana's c l ass ify ing h im  as b lack s i nce he 
was seven-eighths white .? Clear ly the e laborate d i sti nct ion of 
Lou i s iana's l aws served no ascerta i nable pu rpose. 
The genera l  pattern of these laws is  qu i te c lear. The rea l 
i nterest was not i n  determ i n i ng who was b lack but who was not 
wh ite. What emerged was an a lgorithm for d i st i ngu ish i ng 
Whi tes and nonwh ites. The Alabama code i s  typ ica l :  " . . .  the 
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word "negro" i nc l udes m u latto . The word " m u latto" or term 
"person of color" means a person of m ixed b lood descended on 
the part of the father or mother from negro ancestors, without ref­
erence to or l i m it of t ime or number of generations . 8  
Perhaps the c learest attempt to make a s imp le  d i sti nction 
between wh ite and nonwh ite i s  fou nd in the Georg ia code, 
wh ich provides that 
and 
Al l Negroes, m u lattoes, mesti zoes, and thei r descen­
dants, hav i ng any ascerta i nab le trace of either Negro or 
Afr ican, West I nd ian ,  or  As iat ic b lood in thei r ve i ns, 
and a l l descendants of any person hav ing e i ther Negro 
or Afr ican, West I nd i an, or As i at ic I nd ian  b lood i n  h i s  or 
her ve i ns sha l l  be known in th i s  state as persons of 
co lor. 
The term 'wh ite person '  sha l l  i nc l ude on ly  persons of 
the wh ite or Caucas ian  race, who have no ascerta i na­
b le  trace of e i ther Negro, Afr ican, West I nd i an,  As iat ic 
I nd i an,  Mongo l i an,  Japanese, or Ch i nese b lood in thei r 
vei ns .  No person, any of whose ancestors [was] . . .  a 
co lored person or person of co lor, sha l l be deemed to 
be a wh i te person .  9 
S i nce "Ch i nese, Japanese, Mongo l ians . . .  " were not wh ite, it i s  
no su rpr i se to fi nd the Supreme Cou rt uphol d i ng local  dec is ions 
to ass ign a Ch i nese student to a Negro school .lO The "wh ite" 
c lass i fi cat ion rema i ned a lways the most exc l u s ive .  
Above a l l  the  attempt to be prec ise reflects the needs of  a 
soc iety that c lass ifi es peop le  accord i ng to race. Laws that 
requ i red separat ion and d isparate treatment were i ntended to be 
app l i ed to i nd iv idua l s  i n  spec i fi c  i n stances. Segregation l aws 
prov ide an exce l lent example .  If ra i l road conductors were to 
know whom to ass ign to wh ich ra i l road cars, they needed fa i r ly  
prec i se gu ide l i nes for knowing whom to seat where .  I ndeed a 
m i stake was a cause for col lecti ng damages ." If l aws were to 
prevent B lacks or As ians  from attend ing wh i te schoo ls, serv ing 
on j u r ies, ho ld i ng certa i n  federa l  jobs, patron iz i ng p laces of  pub­
l i c  accommodation, or  regu l ati ng i ssues of  fam i ly and cri m i na l  
l aw, then offic i a l s  needed gu i de l i nes that cou l d  be  app l i ed i n  
i nd iv idua l  cases . Mathematica l  o r  sc ient ifi c certa i nty of degrees 
7 
Ethnic Studies Review Volume 26:  2 
of race was not on ly  necess i ty but it was presumed to be poss i ­
b le .  By v i rtue of  j ud ic i a l  pronouncement, a l i tigant cou l d  enter  
a cou rtroom as a b lack person and leave as a m u latto or wh i te 
person .  For example i n  Jones v. Commonwealth, I saac jones 
successfu l ly appea led h i s  sentence of a lmost th ree years for mar­
ry i ng a wh ite woman contrary to "the peace and d ign i ty" of the 
Com monwea l th  of Vi rg i n i a  whose l aw forbade mar r i age 
between "Negroes" and Whites and defi ned a Negro as a person 
with "one-fourth or more negro b lood." Mr. jones asserted that 
he had l ess than one-quarter b lack b lood. Although the cou rt 
fou n d  that jones was a "mu l atto of brown ski n"  and that h i s  
mother was a "ye l l ow woman," i t  found  that the Commonwea l th 
was u nab le to estab l i sh the "quantum of negro b lood i n  h i s  
ve i ns ." The precept, "anyone who i s  not wh ite i s  colored," 
a l though i mperfect, did m i n i m ize amb igu ity. 
C lear ly, most of the l aws prec ise ly defi n i ng race are artifacts 
of the segregation era .  But  s i nce l aw is not a "seam less web," we 
fi nd vestiges of these ki nds of defi n i t ion i n  an era when thei r po l ­
i cy fu nct ion i s  far from obvious .  Two decades ago, a d ispute 
arose over Lou is iana's l aw requ i r i ng anyone of more than 1 /32 
Afr ican descent to be c lass i fied as b l ack. Lou i s iana's 1 /32  l aw i s  
of  re l at ive ly  recent vi ntage; u nti l 1 97 1  the l aw had re l ied on 
"common repute" for rac ia l  c l ass if ications; the return to the o lder 
form was i ntended to e l i m i nate rac ia l  c l ass ifi cations by goss i p  
and i nference. I n  September of 1 982 Mrs .  Sus ie  G u i l lo ry Ph ipps, 
hav i ng d iscovered that her b i rth cert ifi cate c l ass ified her as 
Colored, peti tioned to have her c lass ifi cation changed to Whi te, 
to reflect "her true status as a Caucas ian ." The state objected and 
produced an e leven-generat ion genealogy trac i ng Mrs .  Ph i pps's 
ancestry back to an ear ly eighteenth-centu ry b lack s l ave and a 
wh i te p l antation owner. Mrs. Ph ipps's argument centered on the 
i napp rop riateness of ap ly ing rac ia l  des ignations to i nd iv idua l s  
accu rate ly  and the imposs ib i l ity of  determ i n i ng rac ia l  ancestry 
prec ise ly to meet j ud ic ia l  standards of ev idence. I n  th i s  cur ious 
case and the anachron isti c i ssue i t  represents the u .S .  Supreme 
Cou rt s ided with Lou is iana .1 2 
Although the b lack/ wh ite d i sti nction has been most perva­
s ive, c lear ly B lacks have not been the on ly  nonwh ites. The def­
i n i t ion of As i an-Americans has a h i story of i ts own, centeri ng 
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l a rge ly  on natu ra l i zation and i m m igrat ion cha l l enges . The 
Natu ra l i zation Act of 1 790 provided that on ly  free wh i te persons 
cou ld  become c i t izens, and i n  spite of numerous changes over 
the years, i nc l ud i ng provi d i ng for the natu ra l i zation of persons of 
"Afr ican nativity," Asians  conti nued to be i ne l ig ib le  for c it izen­
sh ip  u nti l the Second Wor ld War. In the l ate n i neteenth centu ry 
both Ch i nese and japanese d id  enter the cou ntry, but they cou ld  
not be natu ra l i zed to be c i t izens u n l ess they were "wh ite." 
As ians sought natu ra l i zation u nder the exi sti ng standards, but 
a lways as Wh i tes. For example, in 1 878 Ch i nese were den ied 
c i t izensh i p  because "a native of Ch i na, of the Mongo l ian race, i s  
not a wh ite person ." Then in  1 922  a l ega l l y  res ident japanese 
peti t ioned for natu ra l i zation, argu i ng that he met the color 
requ i rement. Assoc iate ju sti ce George Sutherl and, speaking for 
the Supreme Cou rt, exp la i ned that "wh ite" d id  not refer to color 
but to membersh i p  in the Caucas ian race. A few months later i n  
the case of a " H i ndu"  appea l i ng the den ia l  of h i s  peti t ion for c i t­
izensh i p, aga i n  speak ing  for the Cou rt, the same just ice 
Suther l and was u n impressed by the fact that I nd i ans are 
Caucas i ans; "wh ite," he dec la red, refers to co lor, not to race. 
Thus with i n  the space of one year the Cou rt had ru l ed both that 
"wh ite" meant the Caucas ian race and not co lor  and that it 
meant co lor and not the Caucas ian race. In both cases the As ian 
peti t ioners were den ied c i t izensh i p  with a natu ra l i zed imm igrant 
from Eng land writ i ng the major i ty dec i s ion .1 3 
j udges even ventu red to i nvo lve themse lves i n  the question 
of proport ion of nonwh ite "b lood" wh ich m ight render one i ne l ­
ig ib le  for c i t izensh ip .  I n  1 934 justi ce Benjam i n  Cardozo, speak­
i ng for a unan i mous Cou rt, offered the fo l l owing d ictum regard­
i ng non-Caucas ians :  
Nor i s  the range of  the exc l us ion l i m i ted to persons of 
the fu l l  b lood . The pr iv i l ege of natu ra l i zation is den ied 
to a l l  who are not wh ite (u n less the app l i cants are of 
Afr ican nativ i ty or Afr ican descent); and men are not 
wh i te if  the stra i n  of co lored b lood in them is a ha l f  or 
a quarter, or, not i mprobably, even less, the govern i ng 
test a lways be i ng that of common u nderstand i ng. 
Twenty five years ear l ier, another federa l j udge had ru led that a 
"person, one-ha l f  wh ite and one-ha l f  of some other race, be longs 
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to ne i ther of those races, but i s  l i tera l ly a ha l f-breed ." 14 
Fo l lowi ng the ru l i ngs that As ians were rac i a l l y  i ne l ig ib le  to 
become Ameri can c i t izens, Congress i n  1 924 proh i b ited the 
i m m i gration of "persons i ne l ig ib le  for c it izensh ip ." The Ch i nese 
had been den ied entry previous ly by the Ch i nese Exc l us ion Act 
of 1 882 , and Japanese imm igrat ion had been severe ly  l i m i ted by 
the Gent lemen's Agreement with Jap an i n  1 907 .  Fu rthermore 
those As ians a l ready res ident i n  the cou ntry were subjected to 
segregat ion i n  schoo ls, hosp ita l s, and hous ing and to exc l us ion 
from the ma instream of employment and pub l i c  affa i rs .  The 
remova l of some 250,000 Mexican-Americans and perhaps an  
equa l  n umber of  Mexicans to Mex ico dur i ng the Depress ion and 
the i nternment and re location of  Japanese-Americans du r i ng  the 
Second  Wor ld  War exempl if ied th is  ki nd of po l i cy. Even when 
exp l i c i t  rac ia l  c l ass ifi cations were a l l  but removed from the l aw 
i n  the I m m igrat ion and Natu ra l i zation Act of 1 952 ,  imm igrat ion 
quotas accompl ished the same resu l t  by severe ly restri cti ng the 
n u m ber of nonwh ites a l l owed to enter the cou ntry. 
To many Americans Southern and Eastern Eu ropeans were 
nonwh i tes. The great waves of i mm igrat ion duri ng the decades 
su rrou nd i ng the turn of the twentieth centu ry created a patch­
work of  ethn i c  m i norit ies and complex patterns of  eth n i c  d i s­
c ri m i nat ion; however, except for imm igrat ion matters such d i s­
cr i m i nat ion d i d  not become embod ied i n  offic i a l  po l i cy. 
D i st i ngu ish i ng the var ious ki nds of "wh i te ethn i cs" i n  a lega l 
code wou l d  have been i nfi n i te ly complex and po l i ti ca l l y  d i sas­
trous; moreover, i t  was u n necessary. Ethn i c  separat ion and d i s­
parate treatment cou ld  th r ive qu i te we l l  as the u noffic ia l  practice 
of both pub l ic  and private i nstitutions .  
The character ization of the H ispan ic  popu lat ion has sh i fted 
from nationa l i ty to race to ethn i c  group.  I n  1 82 1  when Mex ico 
won i ts i ndependence from Spai n ,  Americans d id  not cons ider 
Mex icans to be a separate race; they were wh ite, and u nti l 1 93 0  
the u .S .  Census Bu reau 's i nterest i n  Mexican-Americans, a s  i n  
most i m m igrants, was i n  cou nti ng the fore ign-born popu lation .  
The c lass i fi cat ion "Mexican" was used to des ignate on ly  those 
persons born i n  Mex ico or the i r  ch i ld ren .  In 1 93 0, however, the 
Census Bu reau p laced the term, "Mex ican," u nder the genera l 
rubr ic "other races," wh ich a l so i nc l uded Native Americans, 
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Negroes, and As ians .  In one stroke Mex icans became another 
race, hence nonwh ites. Th i s  was the fi rst t ime that a nat ional i ty 
was forma l ly  recogn ized as a race. I n  add i tion census enumer­
ators were i nstructed to c l ass ify as Mex icans a l l  persons of 
Mexican ancestry regard less of number of generations in the 
U n i ted States . Th i s  des ignation evi nced u nfavorab le reaction 
from the government of Mex ico as we l l  as the U .S .  State 
Department, and was rep laced i n  1 940 by a c l ass i fi cat ion based 
upon the Span i sh  language -whether Span i sh  was the mother 
tongue or not. H i span ics th us became a l i ngu i st ic m i nority. 
Cod i ng i nstructions of the 1 940 Census d i rected that "Mexicans 
were to be l i sted as Whi te, u n less they were defi n i te ly  I nd ian or 
some other race than Whi te." In 1 950  the Span ish su rname def­
i n i t ion was i ntroduced, and at the same ti me, such peop le were 
now c l ass if ied among Wh ites -"wh ite persons of Span ish su r­
name." Mex icans were now wh ite ethn i cs .  Other Lati nos a l so 
became Wh i tes cons i stent with the 1 960 Census wh ich provid­
ed that " Puerto R i cans, Mex icans or other persons of Lati n 
descent [were] to be c lass ified as 'Wh ite' u n l ess they were defi ­
n ite ly Negro, I nd i an,  or some other race." The rec l ass ifi cation 
was s ign i fi cant for some groups :  for example, du r i ng  the Second 
Wor ld War the U .S .  m i l i ta ry c lass ified Puerto R icans as another 
race, wh ich trans l ated to mean they were not wh ite .  U nder that 
po l i cy, the U .S .  Army had p laced Puerto R icans in segregated 
fac i l i t ies, even on the i s l and, and the U .S .  Navy refused to accept 
any of them i nto its ranks .  
I n  the  meant ime states a l so strugg led with categor iz ing 
Lati nos. For example, gu ided by the Encyclopedia Britannica 
wh ich he ld that approx imatel y  one-fifth of Mexicans were 
Whi tes, approx imate ly  two-fi fths were I nd i ans, and the ba l ance 
had Afr ican, Ch i nese and Japanese heritage, an I nd iana appe l l ate 
cou rt ru l ed, i n  I n l and Steel Co, v. Barcena, that a Mex ican was 
not necessari ly  wh ite .  I n  contrast, Independent School District 
v. Salvatierra ( 1 930) and i n  Hernandez v. State ( 1 952 ), Texan 
cou rts ru led that Mexicans are wh ite .  
By the m i dd le  of the twentieth centu ry th i s  i ntri cate patch­
work of rac ia l  and ethn i c  de l i neations and the pol i c ies they 
imp l ied were long overdue for reth i n ki ng .  G lobal events, 
i nc l ud i ng the horr ifi c  rac ia l  po l i c ies of Nazi Germany and 
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aparthe id  South Afri ca, nationa l i st movements i n  the co lon i a l  
wor ld ,  and  ideolog ica l  competit ion for the a l l eg iance o f  the 
newly emergent states, as wel l  as domest ic deve lopments l ed to 
the evo l ut ion of a new model of m i nority re l at ions po l i cy. 
III 
Over a period of perhaps twenty-five years ( rough ly  from the 
1 940s th rough the 1 960s) the focus of l aws on race and eth n ic i ­
ty changed from an i ntention to mandate separate and  d i sparate 
treatment to the forb idd i ng of separat ion and d i sparate treat­
ment.  Segregat ion l aws were repea led or ru led unconstitutiona l ;  
federa l executive orders, adm i n istrative gu ide l i nes, and statutes 
were enacted to forb id d i scr im i nation on the bas i s  of race, co lor, 
or  nationa l  or ig i n .  Pr ivate employers, schoo ls, and other i nst i tu­
t ions erased rac i a l  i dentif i cations from thei r records, often 
rep l ac i ng them with covert cod if ied substitutions .  Race and eth­
n i c i ty became taboo subjects : one was no longer Mex ican,  but a 
"person of Span i sh  descent," no longer a Jew, but a "person of 
the Hebrew persuas ion ." Many fe l t  uncomfortab le with Negro; 
"b l ack" or Afro-American or Afr ican American became prefer­
ab le .  In the same way, "Native American"  rose as an a l ternative 
to I nd i an .  C lear ly consc iousness of race and ethn i c i ty had not 
d i m i n i shed; on the contrary it was probab ly  enhanced by the 
"c iv i l  r ights" movement. 
The 1 964 Civ i l R ights Act i s  the most important nationa l  po l ­
i cy statement of th i s  type. Tit le I I  forb ids d i scri m i nation i n  p laces 
of pub l i c  accommodation on the bas is  of race, co lor, nationa l  
ori g i n ,  or re l ig ion; Ti t le VI does the same th i ng for employment, 
add i ng sex as a proh ib i ted c l ass if icat ion . Re l ig ion i s  br ief ly 
defi ned in the Act, but not one word i nd icates what race, co lor, 
o r  nationa l  or ig i n mean .  We suggest two exp lanations for th i s  
s i l ence -both p laus ib le  and both probab ly  accu rate. Fi rst, the 
sil ence i nd i cates, as a l ready suggested, a rea l d i scomfort with 
these c lass i fi cat ions i n  an era i n  which the th rust i s  to get away 
from c lass ify i ng. More s ign i fi cant ly it i s  not particu l ar ly impor­
tant to defi ne race and ethn ic i ty prec ise ly in a l aw wh ich forbids 
d iscr i m i nation on the bas i s  of race and ethn ic i ty. If restaurant 
owners are forb idden to refuse serv ice on the bas i s  of race, i t  i s  
not i mportant that they know who i s  or who i s  not b lack. Nor 
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need l aw enforcement offi c ia l s  know. 
A statute, of cou rse, is on ly  a genera l  po l i cy statement; for 
i ts deta i l s  and i ts app l i cat ions, we need to consu l t  j ud ic ia l  i nter­
pretat ions and the gu ide l i nes of agenc ies such as the Equa l  
Employment Opportu n i ty Comm iss ion (EEOC) and the Office of 
Management and the B udget (OMB) .  As expected, race is v i r­
tua l ly  undefi ned . EEOC gu ide l i nes on race i nd icate on ly that 
"An emp loyee may be i nc l uded in the group to wh ich he or she 
appears to be long, i dentifies with, or is regarded by the commu­
n ity as  be longi ng." 1S The term "nationa l  or ig i n," however, d id  
seem to ra i se some provocative defi n i t iona l  i ssues. S i mply pro­
h ib it i ng d i scr i m i nation on the bas i s  of nationa l  or ig i n fa i led to 
give adequate d i rect ion to employers . To begi n with the words 
do not mean exactly  what they say. "Nat iona l  or ig i n "  does not 
mean the i nd iv idua l 's own nationa l  orig in ;  it refers to the nation­
a l  or ig i n of h i s  ancestors -rough ly, to h is ethn ic i ty. 16 Th is ambi­
gu i ty engendered considerab le  l i t igation because (despite the 
words of the l aw) i t  i s  qu i te perm i ss ib le  to exc l ude foreign-born 
non-cit izens from numerous ki nds of employment opportu n i ­
ti es, 17 a s  some members of the m i l i ta ry d i scovered a s  recently as 
dur ing  the U .S .  occupation of I raq.  
I t  took a n umber of years to develop an understand ing of 
"nationa l  o r i g i n "  d i scr i m i nat ion ,  and  n u merous  quest ions 
rema i n  unanswered . The EEOC does not prov ide a c l ear defi n i ­
t ion of "nationa l  or ig in ,"  bu t  an un i ssued vers ion of a gu idel i ne 
draft suggests the fo l lowi ng: 
D i scr i m i nat ion based on nationa l  or ig i n sha l l  be 
defi ned broad ly  to mean :  ( 1 ) D i scri m i nat ion based on 
the cou ntry from where an i nd iv idua l  or h i s  forebears 
came; (2 ) D i scr i m i nation aga i nst an i nd iv idua l  who 
possesses the cu ltu ra l  or l i ngu i st ic  character ist ics com­
mon to an ethn i c  or nationa l  group . 1B 
The e lements of "cu ltu ra l  and l i ngu i st ic character ist ics" necess i ­
tated fu rther d i sti nctions .  EEOC gu ide l i nes were e laborated by 
ru l es proh ib i t ing the fo l l owi ng pract ices: 
( 1 ) Den ia l  of equal opportu n i ty to persons marr ied to or 
assoc iated with persons of a spec ifi c  nationa l  or ig i n ;  (2 ) 
Den ia l  of equa l  opportu n i ty because of membersh ip  i n  
l awfu l organ izations identified with o r  seeki ng to pro-
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mote the i nterests of nationa l  groups; (3 ) Den ia l  of 
equa l  opportun ity because attendance at schoo l s  or  
chu rches common ly uti l ized by persons of  a given 
nationa l  or ig i n ;  (4) Den ia l  of equa l  opportu n i ty because 
one's name or that of one's spouse reflects a certa i n  
nationa l  or ig i n . 19 
Fu rthermore Engl i sh  l anguage requ i rements, and height and 
weight requ i rements, i f  not job-rel ated, may u n l awfu l ly d i scr i m­
i nate aga i nst nationa l  m i norit ies. Neither may an employer use 
appearance as a reason for refus ing employment i f  appearance i s  
assoc iated with a particu la r  nationa l  group .  Nor may ethn i c  
harassment (ethn i c  jokes and  s l u rs, for example) be  perm itted to 
create a hosti l e  work envi ronment for a m i nor ity employee. 
A l l of these gu ide l i nes are ph rased as "Thou Sha l t  Not"; they 
attempt to te l l employers what they may not do. Beh i nd th i s  
form i s  a particu l ar v iew of d i scr im i nation .  I t  ref lects a be l i ef that 
d i scr i m i nation i s  a d i screte, i nd iv idua l ,  act wh ich can be pro­
h i b i ted as s imp ly  as any other cri me. Once these d i sagreeab le  
practi ces were e l i m i nated the  remai n i ng cond i tion wou ld  be  one 
of  equa l  opportu n i ty. Th is not ion reflects a "melt i ng pot" v iew of 
the American d ream, i n  wh ich race and ethn ic i ty were to 
become i rre l evant to i nd iv idua l  ach ievement. Defi n i ng ethn ic i ­
ty was u n i mportant --even repugnant- because ethn i c  d i sti nc­
t ions shou ld  be u n i mportant. Th is  was a compe l l i ng v is ion;  for 
many, it remai ns so. As a gu ide l i ne for pub l i c  pol i cy, however, 
it d i d  not work. 
D i scri m i nation tu rned out to be not a d i screte act, but a sys­
tem i c  process. Rac ia l  and ethn i c  c l ass ifi cations cou l d  be ob l i t­
erated from the record, and the i r  effects remai n u ntouched . 
Cou ntl ess other character ist ics -wea lth, res idency, educationa l  
atta i nment, Eng l i sh l anguage profic iency, for examp le- cou l d  
eas i l y  stand i n  the p lace of race o r  ethn ic i ty, a nd  produce the 
same exc l us ions .  As early as the m id-1 960s observers began to 
rea l i ze that we m ight need rac ia l ly  or ethn i ca l l y  consc ious sol u­
t ions  to rac ia l  and ethn i c  prob lems .  I n  the words of  Assoc iate 
Just ice Harry B l ackmun, " I n  order to get beyond rac ism, we must 
fi rst take account of race. There i s  no other way. And i n  order to 
treat some persons equa l ly, we m ust treat them d i fferent ly. We 
cannot -we dare not- let the Equal  Protection C lause perpetuate 
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rac ia l  supremacy." Consequent ly, as the pol i c ies changed, so did 
the ways of defi n i ng race and eth n ic i ty. 20 
IV 
S i nce d iscr i m i nation i s  system ic, it needs system ic  so l ut ions .  
Above a l l  so l ut ions requ i red not on ly  i nd iv idua l  proh i b i tions but 
po l i c ies a imed at affect ing the opportun i t ies of m i norit ies in the 
aggregate . Th is  deve lopment can be observed most c lear ly i n  the 
employment and pol i t ica l  po l i c ies, because both affect large 
numbers of peop le, and because they have produced deta i led 
and profuse gu ide l i nes, regu l at ions, and j ud ic i a l  dec i s ions .  
The s imp le  ki nd of d i scri m i nation-the i nd iv idua l ,  i ntention­
a l  act wh ich the 1 964 Civi l R i ghts Act sought to proh ib i t-tu rned 
out to be very d i ffi cu l t  to prove. The comp la i nant assumes the 
burden of provi ng that the employer i ntended to d i scr i m i nate . A 
c lever employer with any soph i sti cat ion can obscu re such i ntent 
by adopti ng apparent ly neutra l  cr i ter ia wh ich have a rac ia l l y  or 
ethn i ca l ly  d i sproportionate i mpact. Hence, to combat di scri m i­
nation i n  practice, it becomes important to focus  not on i ntent, 
but on the impact of an employment practice. Emp loyment cr i ­
ter ia (tests, educationa l  atta i nment, Engl i sh  language, for exam­
p le) wh ich adverse ly and d i sproport ionate ly  affect eth n i c  m i nor i­
t ies are cons idered " i n herent ly suspect"; the i r  use sh i fts the bur­
den of proof from the comp la i nant to the emp loyer, maki ng the 
employer respons ib le  for defend ing the va l i d ity of h is cr iter ia by 
demonstrat ing the i r  re levance to actua l  job performance.2 1 
Not on ly  i n  employment but a l so i n  voti ng, education, and 
other areas, po l i cy deve lopments reflect a sh i ft i n  emphas i s  from 
the i nd iv idua l  act of i ntentiona l  d i scr i m i nation to a focus on the 
aggregate effect of a practice and the des ign i ng of aggregate 
so l ut ions .  The 1 965 Voti ng Rights Act, as amended, was adopt­
ed exp l i c i t ly because ear l ier  attempts to remedy d i scr i m i nation 
through i nd iv idua l  cha l lenges had proven u nsuccessfu l .  Vot ing 
d iscr i m i nat ion aga i nst m i nor it ies, rangi ng from i ngen ious lega l 
subterfuges to phys ica l  harassment, had long been an i ntri ns ic  
e lement of  the pol i t ica l  process i n  many areas. The Act outl awed 
the devices that had been des igned to exc l ude m i nor it ies from 
the franch ise (po l l taxes and l i teracy tests, for example) .  More 
i mportant, i t  prov ided that where voter regi stration was be low 
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fi fty percent, and where such devices had been used, the l ow 
reg i stration  wou l d  be presumed to have resu l ted from i ntention­
a l  acts, and wou ld  th us trigger spec ia l  scruti ny of any changes i n  
e lectora l  procedu res by the Just ice Department.22 As with fed­
era l  emp loyment gu ide l i nes the tr iggeri ng mechan ism i s  d i spro­
port ionate i mpact on m i norit ies, and the goa l i s  to produce 
aggregate resu l ts .  From aggregate remed ies i t  i s  only a smal l step 
to aggregate programs such as aff i rmative act ion, wh ich mandate 
that some preference be given to m i nor ity candidates i n  order to 
enhance the aggregate representat ion of these groups i n  the 
workp l ace, schoo l ,  or voti ng d i stri ct. 
Th i s  change in pol i cy ra i ses some fasci nati ng issues .  I n  
order to show d i sproport ionate impact, one must be ab le to co l ­
l ect some comparative data about the proport ions of m i nor i ty 
members i n  the cha l lenged i nstitution and i n  the popu l at ion as a 
who le .  Thus  it becomes important aga i n  to have defi n i t ions of 
race and ethn i c i ty. Fu rthermore, the ki nds of defi n i tions needed 
are d i fferent from those requ i red previous ly. One no longer 
needs i nd iv idua l l y  prec ise a lgorithms but workable heur ist ics for 
co l l ecti ng aggregate data . Who can c l a im  m i nority status now 
becomes cruc ia l . Po l i t ica l ly  it becomes extremely s ign ifi cant 
who cou nts as "wh ite" and who cou nts as a m i nor ity and how 
the m i nor it ies are grouped together. I n  the end pursu i ng a tech­
n i ca l  question l i ke defi n it ions of  race and ethn ic i ty leads to  some 
of the fu ndamenta l  i ssues of American p l u ra l i sm .  
The ab i l i ty to make a negative impact c l a im depends upon 
the ava i lab i l i ty of  ethn i c  data . Hence, wh ich groups are i nc l ud­
ed in  which categor ies and how the groups are defi ned become 
pol i t ica l ly  i mportant. Race remai ns the most cruc i a l .  Whereas 
p rev ious defi n it ions of race sought some k ind of objective cr i te­
r ion,  contemporary model s  re ly m uch more heav i l y  on se l f- or 
com m u n ity-i dentifi cat ion . The Census Bu reau prefers se l f- iden­
t ifi cation, augmented by some s imple gu ide l i nes i n  case of ambi­
gu i ty: 
The concept of race as used by the Census Bu reau 
reflects self- i dentifi cation by respondents; i t  does not 
denote any c l ear-cut scient ifi c  defi n i t ion of b io logica l  
stock. S i nce the 1 980 census obta i ned i nformation on 
race through se l f- identif icat ion, the data represent self-
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c lass ifi cation by peop le  accord i ng to the race with 
wh i ch they ident ify. For persons who cou l d  not provide 
a s i ng le response to the race question,  the race of the 
person 's mother was used; however, i f  a s i ng le response 
cou ld  not be provided for the person 's mother, the fi rst 
race reported by the person was used . Th i s  is a modif i­
cation of the 1 970 census procedu re, in wh ich the race 
of a person 's father was used . . . .  
The category ' B l ack' i nc l udes persons who i nd icated 
the i r  race as B l ack or Negro, as wel l  as persons who d id 
not c l ass i fy themse lves in  one of  the spec if ic race cate­
gor ies l i sted on the questionna i re, but reported entr ies 
such as Jamaican,  B lack Puerto R ican, West I nd ian, 
Hait ian,  or N i geri an .23 
The most deta i l ed defi n i t ions ava i l ab le  on race and eth n ic i­
ty are those used in Federa l  Contract Comp l i ance, wh ich 
requ i res employers to ma i nta i n  records on the race and ethn ic i ­
ty of  job app l i cants . liThe G lossary of  Terms" i n  the compl iance 
manua l  i nc l udes the fo l lowi ng defi n i t ions :  
American I nd ian  or A laskan Native -A person with 
orig ins  i n  any of the or ig i na l  peoples of North America 
who ma i nta i ns cu ltu ra l  identif ication th rough tri bal 
affi l i ation or com m u n ity recogn it ion . 
As ian  or Pacif ic I s l ander -A person with or ig i ns i n  
any of the or ig i na l  peop les of the Far East, Southeast 
As ia, the I nd ian  sub-conti nent, or the Pac ifi c  I s l ands.  
Th is  i nc l udes, for example, Ch i na, Japan, Korea, the 
Ph i l ipp i ne Repub l i c, and Samoa. 
B l ack, not H i span i c  or ig i n -A person with or ig ins i n  
any of the b lack rac ia l  groups of Afr ica who i s  a l so not 
of H i span i c  or ig i n .  
H i span i c  -A person of Mex ican,  Puerto R ican,  
Cuban,  South Ameri can, or Span i sh  cu ltu re or or ig i n ,  
regard less of  race . 
Wh i te, not of H i span ic  or ig i n -A person with orig ins  
i n  any of  the  or ig i na l  peop les of  Eu rope, North Afr ica, 
or the Midd le  East who are not of H i span ic  or ig i n .24 
Beh ind  these defi n it ions l ies a subt le theory of ethn i c ity as a geo­
graph i c  phenomenon .  Each defi n i t ion is ph rased in terms of the 
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geograph i c  or ig i ns of the person 's ancestors . The notion that an  
i nd iv idua l  has "orig i ns" other than h i s  or her p lace of  b i rth 
appears vague if not mystica l .  Moreover i t  seems u nsati sfy i ng to 
conceive of ethn i c ity on ly  in terms of the nationa l  roots of one's 
ancestors . Some groups-I r i sh -Amer i cans, o r  Mex i can ­
Amer icans-may i ndeed th i n k  of the i r  ethn i c i ty a s  re l ated to the 
cou ntry of thei r ancestors' orig in ;  however, such a conceptua l ­
i zation  gives great consternation to ethn i ca l ly  consc ious Jews of 
d iverse geograph ica l  "orig i ns ." Second ly, it seems to m iscon­
ceive the essentia l  phenomenon of b lack ethn ic i ty. "Orig i ns  i n  
Afr ica" are probably not at the heart of the subjective exper ience 
of b l ack ethn i c i ty as much as perceptions of a shared h i story i n  
Amer ica and obvious d i sti ngu i sh i ng character isti cs such a s  co lor. 
Fu rthermore the obvious vagueness of these defi n i tions i s  
extremely i nstructive .  It i s  qu i te easy for persons of  m ixed ances­
try to fa l l  th rough the cracks in the defi n i tion,  the creat ion of the 
B i rac i a l  category in the 2 000 Census and in a number of recent­
ly  enacted state l aws notwithstand i ng. For example how does 
one c l ass ify a person of m ixed As ian and Eu ropean parentage? 
The answer i s  that i t  does not rea l l y  matter. S i nce these gu ide­
l i nes are used for co l l ecti ng aggregate data and the maki ng of 
aggregate pol icy, no treatment of any i nd ividua l  shou l d  depend 
on whether he or she i s  c l ass ified As ian or Wh ite .  Occas iona l ly, 
there may be i nfu r iati ng i nj ustices, such as i ntentiona l  m i sc l ass i ­
f icat ions i n  order to take advantage of m i nor ity-sens it ive pro­
grams .  But the poi nt of these gu ide l i nes i s  rea l l y  not to assu re 
i nd iv idua l ly  equa l  treatment (that goa l i s  sti l l  hand led u nder the 
non-d i scr im i nation model )  but to promote genera l  changes i n  
m i nor i ty representat ion . 
One i s  rem i nded of Ari stotle's admon it ion not to demand 
more prec is ion than the subject requ i res . Race, b io log ists sug­
gest, i s  pu re ly  a stati stica l  concept wh ich makes no sense as 
app l i ed to i nd iv idua ls .  G roup defi n i t ions therefore become the 
on ly  ki nd poss ib le .  Hence the search for i nd iv idua l ly  app l icab le  
defi n it ions wou ld  be futi le .  Ethn ic i ty a l so refers to the shared 
attri butes of groups and thus character izes i nd iv idua l s  on ly  i n  
thei r group re l ations .  
If one i s  go i ng to cha l lenge and to change practices based 
on the i r  impact on m i norit ies, comparative data m ust be ava i l -
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able .  But data is co l lected about some groups and not others, 
and the way that the h uman popu l at ion is c l ass if ied is as pol i t i ­
cal ly  s ign i fi cant as i t  i s  arbi trary. Certa i n l y  no anth ropologist 
cou ld  j ust ify treati ng H i span ic  as para l l e l  with B l ack, White, and 
As ian .  The poi nt i s  that H i span ics are l i sted separate ly  because 
they have a u n ique pos it ion i n  the American experience, and 
thus are regarded as m i norit ies .  We can u nderstand the i mpor­
tance of th i s  i nc l us ion by observi ng i ts pol i t ica l  s ign i fi cance in a 
concrete i n stance. I n  1 973 the c i ty of Denver was accused of 
segregati ng its pub l i c  schoo ls .  Whether the charge cou l d  be sub­
stanti ated depended upon whether H i span ic  students were 
cou nted as wh ite or nonwh ite for the pu rpose of school ass ign­
ment .  If H i span i c  students were cou nted as wh i te, the school 
d i stri ct d id  not appear to be segregated, but i f  they were cons id­
ered m i nor it ies (a long with b l acks), the system appeared qu i te 
segregated . The Supreme Cou rt's hand l i ng of th i s  i ssue gives an 
idea of i ts po l i cy s ign i fi cance. 
[Al word m ust be sa id about the D i strict Cou rt's method 
of defi n i ng a 'segregated' schoo l .  Denver i s  a tri -eth n i c, 
as d i sti ngu i shed from a b i rac ia l  com m u n ity. The over­
a l l  rac ia l  and ethn i c  compos it ion of the Denver pub l ic  
school s  i s  66% Anglo, 1 4% Negro, and 2 0% H ispano. 
The D i str ict cou rt in assess i ng the question of de j u re 
segregation i n  the core c i ty schoo ls, pre l i m i nar i ly  
reso lved that Negroes and H i spanos shou ld  not be 
p laced i n  the same category to estab l i sh the segregated 
character of the school . . . .  Later, i n  determ i n i ng the 
schoo l s  that were l i ke ly  to produce an i nfer ior educa­
t iona l  opportun i ty, the cou rt conc l u ded that a school  
wou ld  be cons idered i nfer ior on ly  if  i t  had a "concen­
tration of e ither Negro or H i spano students in  the gen­
era l  area of  70 to 75% . . . .  
We conc l ude . . .  that the D istrict cou rt erred i n  sep­
arati ng Negroes and H i spanos for pu rposes of defi n i ng 
a 'segregated schoo l .' We have he ld that H i spanos con­
st i tute an  i dent i fi ab l e  c l ass for pu rposes of the 
Fou rteenth Amendment. But  there i s  a l so much ev i ­
dence that i n  the Southwest H i spanos and  Negroes 
have a great many th i ngs i n  common . . . .  [Tl hough of 
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d i fferent or ig i ns, Negroes and H ispanos i n  Denver suf­
fer ident ica l  d i scr i m i nation i n  treatment when com­
pared with treatment afforded Anglo students .  I n  that 
c i rcumstance, we th i n k  pet it ioners are ent it led to have 
schoo ls  with a combi ned predom i nance of Negroes 
and H i spanos i nc l uded i n  the category of 'segregated' 
schoo ls .25 
Not on ly  who i s  a m i nor ity but a l so who i s  not a m i nor ity i s  
s ign if icant .  S i nce "m i norit ies," for a l l  pract ical  pu rposes, are l i m­
i ted to  b l acks, As ians, and  H i span ics, i t  i s  v i rtua l ly  imposs ib l e  for 
so-ca l led "wh ite eth n i cs" to make adverse i mpact c l a i ms .  
Because separate figu res are not kept for Po les, I ta l i ans, Jews, 
Arabs, etc . ,  they lack the comparative data to show that they 
have been d i sproportiona l ly exc l u ded from employment or other 
opportu n it ies. Joseph Alegrett i ,  an eth ic i st and l abor l aw spe­
c i a l i st, writes: 
[OJ  i sparate impact requ i res stat ist ica l  proof of the effect 
of the effect of an employment practi ce on the p la i nt iff's 
group i n  comparison to other groups.  Compi l i ng the 
needed stati stics i s  not a prob lem for b lack or fema le or 
Span i sh-su rnamed p la i ntiffs . However, the absence of 
necessary stat isti ca l  i nformation presents a near ly i nsu r­
mou ntab le  barr ier to a person of Po l i sh ,  I r i sh ,  or 
Russ ian ancestry who wishes to bri ng a d i sparate 
i mpact case . The reason for the dearth of i nformation i s  
s i mp le :  no governmenta l  agency requ i res employers to 
comp i l e  data on the nationa l  or ig i n of employees . The 
EEOC's reporti ng forms such as the EEO-1 l i m i t  the i r  
categor ization to five groups: b lack, H i span ic, As ian ,  
American I nd ian ,  and wh ite.  Persons of  Eu ropean or  
North American or ig i n are c l ass if ied as wh i te .  The 
U n iform G u ide l i nes on Employee Se lection Procedu re 
of the Office of Federa l  Contract Comp l i ance Programs 
(OFCCP) affi rmative act ion gu idel i nes . . .  adopt the 
same c l ass if ied scheme. 
L i kewise, the 1 970 census i nc l uded questions on 
race and Span i sh  or ig i n ,  but the only questio!1 con­
cern i ng other ethn i c  groups was one that asked the 
cou ntry of or ig i n of one's parents .  Thus the Census 
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Bu reau does not comp i l e  the ethn i c  i dent ity statistica l  
i nformation that i s  necessary to br i ng a d i sparate 
impact c la im .26 
One of the more i ntr igu i ng i nstances of th i s  morass was 
ra i sed by an attempt u nder the 1 965 Vot ing Rights Act to redraw 
the e lectora l d i stri ct bou ndar ies i n  New York C i ty i n  order to 
enhance the voti ng strength of b l acks and Puerto R icans .  To do 
so a predom inant ly Has id ic  e lectora l d i strict was sp l i t and its vot­
i ng strength serious ly  eroded . The Supreme Cou rt uphe ld th i s  
procedu re as  a legit i mate effort to correct the d i sabi l i t i es suffered 
by m i norit ies .  Has i d im  may be a m i nor ity, but for pu rposes of 
the Voti ng Rights Act they were s imp ly  "wh ite."27 
Cons iderab le  controversy a l so arose over the i nc l us ion of 
As i an -Amer icans  among d i sadvantaged app l i cants i n  the 
U n ivers ity of Ca l i forn ia spec ia l  adm iss ions program cha l lenged 
i n  the Bakke case. In sp ite of ethn i c  d i scr i m i nat ion Asian­
Americans ach ieved h igh rates of  adm i ss ion to profess iona l  
schoo ls  even u nder regu la r  adm i ss ions procedu res; hence, some 
argued that the i r  i nc l us ion in the spec ia l  adm i ss ions program 
u nfa i r ly d i sadvantaged other m i norit ies. 
C lear ly there i s  no s imp le  answer to dec id i ng wh ich m i nori ­
ties are m i nor it ies i n  American soc iety. The d i ffi cu l ty of selecti ng 
some m i nor ities in a p l u ra l i sti c setti ng was qu ite wel l stated in 
the Bakke op i n ion by Justi ce Powel l :  
[ I l t  was n o  longer poss ib le  to peg the guarantees of the 
Fou rteenth Amendment to the strugg le for equa l i ty of 
one rac ia l  m i nor ity. Du ri ng the dormancy of the Equal  
Protection C lause, the U n i ted States had become a 
nation of m i norities .  Each had to strugg le-and to 
some extent sti l l-to overcome the prej ud ices not of a 
mono l i th i c  major i ty, but of a "major i ty" composed of 
var ious m i nor ity groups of whom i t  was said-perhaps 
u nfa i r ly in many cases-that a shared character ist ic was 
wi l l i ngness to d i sadvantage other groups . As a nat ion 
fi l l ed with the stock of many l ands, the reach of the 
C lause was gradua l ly  extended to a l l ethn i c  groups 
seeki ng protect ion from offic ia l  d i scr i m i nation . . . .  
The concepts of 'major i ty' and 'm i nor ity' necessar i ­
ly  reflect temporary arrangements and pol i t ica l  j udg-
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ments . . . .  [T] he white 'major ity' i s  i tse l f  composed of 
var ious m i nor ity groups, most of which can l ay c l a im  to 
a h i story of pr ior d i scr im i nation at the hands of the state 
and pr ivate i nd iv idua l s .  Not a l l  of these groups can 
receive preferenti a l  treatment and correspond ing j ud i ­
c i a l  to l erance of d i st inct ions d rawn i n  terms of race and  
nat iona l i ty, for then the on ly  'major i ty' left wou l d  be  the 
new m i nor ity of Wh ite Anglo-Saxon Protestants .  There 
i s  no pr i nc ip led bas i s  of dec id i ng wh ich groups wou l d  
mer it  'he ightened j ud ic ia l  so l i c i tude,' a nd  wh ich wou l d  
not.28 
The Bakke dec is ion is profound ly  ambiva lent. On the one 
hand the Cou rt p l u ra l i ty rejects the content ion that any group of 
m i nor i ties can l ay c l a im to permanent m i nor ity status and spe­
c i a l  so l i c i tude at the expense of i nd iv idua l  fa i rness. On the other  
hand the p l u ra l i ty recogn izes that rac i a l l y  and ethn i ca l l y  sens i ­
tive p rograms a re necessary to ach ieve the  soc ia l  d ivers i ty that a 
p l u ra l i st society pu rports to va l ue .  Both of these pos i t ions were 
re-enforced by Justi ce Sandra Day O'Connor with her dec i s ion  i n  
Grutter v. Bol/inger.29 These cases reflect m uch more than the 
Cou rt's ambiva lence, rather the d i lemma of an enti re society 
caught between two compet ing mode l s  of m i nor ity re l at ions .  
Cu rrent l ega l defi n it ions of race and ethn i c ity th us reflect a 
p rofound  ambiva lence toward ethn i c  and rac ia l  c l ass if icat ions .  
Amer icans are caught between the model  of i nd iv idua l  j u st ice 
i m p l i ed by the non-d iscr im i nation model and the compet ing 
des i re for a rac i a l l y  and ethn ica l ly  j ust soc iety. They deep ly  
va l ue the co lor-b l i nd nond i scr im i nation model with i ts rejection 
of ethn i c  c l ass ifi cations as i rre levant and repugnant. And yet, 
va l u i ng resu l ts, they recogn ize that a p l u ra l i st ic soc iety can on ly  
be ach ieved by effecti ng changes i n  the way m i nor it ies are rep­
resented i n  var ious sectors of American l i fe .  C lass ify i ng i s, at 
best, a necessary evi l .  The need for aggregate so l ut ions imp l ies 
a need to c lass ify; hence defi n it ions are constructed . The defi n i ­
t ions, however, are a lmost absurd ly  vague. Defi n i t ions ph rased 
i n  terms of "orig ins  i n "  an area reflect a d i scomfort with any but 
the most open-ended c lass ifi cat ions .  Even more i nd icative of 
th i s  u neasi ness is the i ns i stence on self- i dentif icat ions rather than 
the "objective" cr iter ia of the ear ly model (percentages of 
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"b lood," for example) .  In short, the i mprec i s ion of cu rrent defi ­
n it ions of race and ethn i c ity i s  enti re ly appropri ate, reflecti ng as 
it does a p l u ra l i st soc iety's wel l -grounded d i scomfort with c lass i ­
fyi ng and categoriz i ng  the human popu l ation .  
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